NAD Supporting Them Support Themselves

Somaliland, an African exception

Thu, 11 Nov 2010 12:25:00 +0000

To the south lies Somalia, the archetypal failed state. To the north,Somaliland, which in June organised one of the most democratic elections Africa has seen for a long time. The explanation for thiscontrast lies in history. When Britain occupied the north of Somalia at the end of the 19th century, it intended only to prevent the Frenchfrom gaining a strategic outlet on the Red Sea, and provide cheap foodfor its colony in Aden, in the Arabian desert. The British were not concerned with making money from the territory and were content to runit at arm's length, interfering little with the indigenous system of governance and (effective) mechanisms for resolving conflict in a nomadic society.

The Italians took a radically different approach when they colonised the south. At the Berlin conference to divide Africa in 1884-85, a newly unified Italy demanded recognition, despite its political and economic backwardness as compared with the rest of western Europe.Italy's colonial ambitions were neither strategic nor economic: its ought compensatory glory (and to populate new areas to stem the emigration of its citizens, particularly to the US and Argentina). Fascism did nothing to temper Italy's pretensions; the fascist government used the imperialist project to provide its people with a compensatory psychodrama, resulting, in the 1920s, in massacres in its colonies and the destruction of indigenous mechanisms for social control.

The Somali people were divided by colonisation, but bound together by culture. They saw independence as the path to unification. Creating a Greater Somalia became a key nationalist aim, and led to the unification of the colonies under the first free Somali government in1960. This created tension with the Organisation of African Unity, setup in 1963, which insisted on respect for colonial era borders (1).

But the new country was built on a paradox: territories divided by history found themselves together again within the framework of an ambiguous pan-nationalist project which gave them an artificial sense of unity. The test of this came in 1977 when Somalia, under the dictator Mohamed Siad Barre (2), invaded the Ogaden, an ethnically Somali region of neighbouring Ethiopia and the cornerstone of Greater Somalia. The war ended in a defeat with the triple effect of destroying the grand nationalist project, turning Somali clans against each other in their search for a scapegoat, and causing Siad Barre to make the clans in the north (former British Somaliland) pay for the conflict. A million refugees from the Ogaden arrived in Somalia on the heels of the retreating army. Siad Barre settled them in the north and armed them. He not only gave them wide administrative powers but a free hand to plunder.

The danger Somalis had always chosen to ignore - fragmentation of the clans - now came about, with the dictatorship's blessing. With the dream of a Greater Somalia dead, the government encouraged some clans to suppress others, redrawing the north-south border inherited from the colonial era.

Rebellion in the north In 1981 the north rebelled,beginning a 10 year civil war in which all those excluded from power rose up, one after another, against the dictatorship. It fell in 1991 leading to the collapse of the Somali state, since no confederation of clans proved able to replace the regime's scheming with constructive alliances.

The north took the opportunity to declare independence and withdraw from the fratricidal conflict into which the south had sunk. Although the first few years were chaotic, the 1993 Borama inter-clan conference provided the country with representative institutions which assured its democratic foundation. While Somaliland found its feet relatively quickly, the south plunged deeper into chaos. From 1992 to 1995 the"international community" occupied southern Somalia, at the behest of the US. Operation Restore Hope did anything but that - the 35,000 soldiers deployed by more than 30 armies, at a cost of $5bn,achieved nothing and were evacuated after two and a half years (3).Weakened by outside interference, Somalia also suffered from internal stresses. Since 1992 there have been 14 attempts to reform the government. All have failed.

This is where the colonial legacy is most evident: in the north,Somaliland incorporated its ancient clan mechanisms for managingconflict into English common law to create its own form of democracy.In the south, where Italian imperialism and fascism had eroded theindigenous system but contributed no new political or legal functions,the uncontrolled clan system hindered the emergence of any form ofgovernment, even an authoritarian one. Somalia's Transitional FederalGovernment (TFG), in place since 2004 and recognised internationally,only controls a few streets in the centre of the capital Mogadishu -and even that is due to the support of 6,000 soldiers from the AfricanUnion Mission in Somalia (Amisom). The TFG has been torn apart bypersonal quarrels and corruption, and has to deal with an Islamist insurgency which, in July, launched terrorist attacks in Kampala,Uganda, to provoke an international crisis. In fact nationalism hasmore influence in Somalia than Islamism, and it offers the militants ofHarakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen (movement of fighting youth) theopportunity to rebuild a national consensus around the idea of resistance, and to assuage the fears provoked by their extremism.

Absence of recognition

Upto now Somaliland has managed to keep its distance from the violencenext door which has led to tens of thousands of deaths, a million refugees, and two million internally displaced over the last 20 years.The irony is that the "international community" refuses to recognise this oasis of peace and democracy, while it continues to givelegitimacy to Somalia on the basis of the 1960 unification, even though it is a state in name only, incapable of meeting any democratic criteria or of re-establishing peace. While the US, UK, and France arebeginning to question the wisdom of this policy, inertia and convention stand in the way of Somaliland's recognition. Western powers do notwant to offend the Arab world, which sees Ethiopia - a Christian "foreign body" in a predominantly Muslim region - as the enemy. Egypth as always wanted a strong and united Somalia to serve as an ally against Ethiopia (4), and the existence of Somaliland interferes with this strategy.

That is why Somaliland needs to be beyond reproach. "They will expect more from us than from others, but give usless," predicted a former vice-president of Somaliland just before the election. But Somaliland still has a long way to go: the outgoing head of state, Hassan Dahir Riyale Kahin, who came to power in May 2002, did not have a spotless democratic career. As vice president, he replaced President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal when Egal died of natural causes in May 2002. He then manipulated the Guurti (upper house of parliament) inorder to have the elections postponed so he could stay in office. In September 2009, threatened by popular revolt and a rebellion inparliament, he asked the army chief of staff to move on the capital Hargeisa, with the probable aim of suspending parliament. But, after thinking about it for 24 hours, the head of the army refused to take part in this "legal coup", and the president was obliged to set a datefor elections.

Somaliland's constitution limits the number of political parties to three. Riyale Kahin runs Udub, a party he formed with Egal, the "Father of the Republic". Seventeen years in power encouraged the familiar pattern of clientelism and nepotism, but while these are common in Africa, in Somaliland they are limited by a free press, genuine freedom of speech, for which a robust civil society battled hard, and a legislative body that is not totally corrupt.Udub's old opponent, Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo, created a strong and organised opposition in the Kulmiye party. The joker in the pack is the small new party Ucid, led by Faisal Ali Warabe, which combines thepositive element of openness to women, minority clans and intellectuals, with a dangerous complacency towards Islamist extremists. As a result, Ucid is often perceived as opportunist, readyto use any means to dislodge the two traditional parties. Warabe is much younger than Kahin or Silanyo, and does not belong to the civilwar generation. He does not see Somaliland as a miracle of willpower,but as a normal political entity, and this attitude has brought him support among young voters.

The election went ahead smoothly on26 June, and on 1 July the national electoral commission declared Silanyo the winner with 49% of the votes. Kahin got 33% and Warabe 17%.The turnout was 88% of 1.09 million registered voters. The role of the70 foreign observers was largely symbolic, to legitimise the process,which took place in a visibly calm atmosphere. So can the goodwill and good organisation of the elections mean that Somaliland, which haslived without international aid for 20 years, will achieve the recognition it desires? Probably not, at least in the short term. Too many people are opposed - including those nostalgic for a Greater Somalia, Islamist extremists and conservative diplomats. Some of its supporters fear that, in any case, full recognition will only aggravatethe antagonisms that have devastated Somalia. Perhaps an intermediate status is possible, where Somaliland would have most of the legal and commercial advantages of recognition, and not provoke too much opposition.

{Gérard Prunier is researcher at CNRS, Paris, and former director of the French Centre for Ethiopian Studies in Addis Ababa}

Africans must not rely on the so-called millennium goals

Thu, 11 Nov 2010 12:05:00 +0000

In the next few days, many sweet words will once again be issued fromthe UN about the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa, given the special summit being held in New York. Professor Jeffrey Sachs,director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University in the UnitedStates, who is not normally uncritical of the performance of the G8 when it comes to their attitude towards the eradication of poverty in Africa, is quite upbeat about the possibilities available to rich nations before the 2015 landmark for achieving the MDGs arrives.

Writing in the London Guardian on 21 September 2010, Sachs declared: ‘The Millennium Development Goals have triggered the largest cooperative effort in world history to fight poverty, hunger, and disease. They have become a rallying cry in poor and rich countries alike. Ten years after their adoption, they are alive and stronger than ever, inspiring breakthroughs around the globe. The world wants them to work. We are just five years from the target year 2015. If we aim high, great outcomes are within reach. Africa can achieve food security; all boys and girls can complete primary education, and millions more, secondary education; solar and other energy sources can bring electricity into remote villages and primary healthcare can prevent millions of deaths annually and encourage families to have fewer children in the confidence they will stay alive. We can choose, in short, to achieve the millennium development goals, and look beyond 2015 to the end of extreme poverty in our generation.’

It is tempting to mock Sachs for having been infected with a mild form of euphoria by the proximity of so many heads of state in the UN building, all brandishing well-researched papers enthusing about what will be happening by 2015;what can be done and what is projected to be achieved. In fact, Sachs himself, in an earlier article published in the Guardian on 4 July 2010 gave the G8 a ‘fail’ mark when he juxtaposed the promises they had made, especially at the Gleneagles summit in Scotland in 2005, with the achievements - or non-achievements - recorded in development since then. The United Kingdom government was the only one that passed the Sachs ‘accountability test’. Of the rest, he found that not only were some not attempting to achieve goals they had themselves pledged to achieve, but also that some of them were deliberately fudging figures to give the wrong impression.

For instance, figures were at times badly stated in today's money and had not taken account of how inflation had eaten into them since they were pledged five years ago. The ‘most important pledge of all the G8's promises,’ Sachs wrote, was ‘the Gleneagles one which stated that by 2010, they would increase they early development assistance to the world's poor, by $50bn, relative to 2004. Half of the increase, or $25bn per year, would go to Africa, the G8 said.’ But the G8, says Sachs, ‘fell far short of this goal,especially with respect to Africa... Aid to Africa rose by $10bn-$15bn per year, rather than $25bn. The properly measured shortfall is even greater, because the promises that were made in 2005 should be adjusted for inflation. Re-stating those commitments in real terms...aid to Africa should have risen by around $30bn. In effect, the G8 fulfilled only half of its promise to Africa - roughly $15bn in increased aid rather than $30bn.’

You see why I am surprised at the optimism with which Sachs views the possibilities opened by the UN summit on the MDGs? People's future behaviour is usually predicated upon their past behaviour. If, in spite of the hopes aroused by the G8 at Gleneagles to, in the words of one of the campaigning groups, ‘make poverty history’, only 50 per cent of aid pledged to Africa materialised, why should anyone take what the G8 say at the New York summit seriously? One of the more penetrating observations made by Sachs in his accounting of G8 pledges of aid and delivery, was his detection of the fact that ‘much’ of the overall G8 increase in aid ‘went to Iraq and Afghanistan, as part of the US-led war effort, rather than to Africa’.

(However, in case anyone is tempted to believe that any country that wants increased aid would be best advised to invite the US to invade it, the true situation should be known: much of the ‘aid’ to Iraq and Afghanistan usually goes into the pockets of American companies which carry out contract work for the US military.The rest mainly consists of arms to the client governments of the US in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is wrongly classified as ‘aid’, because, in Iraq, for instance, seven years after the Americans landed there,electricity has not been generally restored and health facilities and schools bombed to the ground remain in that state.)

Expanding on his charge that the G8 manipulate aid figures, Sachs describes what is in effect a sleight of hand by the G8 (though he fails to call the practice by its correct name). He writes: ‘Since the G8 was off track in its aid commitments for many years, I long wondered what the G8 would say in 2010, when the commitments actually fell due. In fact, the G8 displayed two approaches. First, in an “accountability report”, the G8 stated the 2005 commitments in current dollars rather, than in inflation-adjusted dollars, in order to minimise the size of the reported shortfall. Second, the G8…simply did not mention the unmet commitments at all. In other words, the G8 accountability principle became: if the G8 fails to meet an important target, stop mentioning the target - a cynical stance, especially at a summit (Canada 2010) heralded for “accountability.”’ Sachs adds: ‘The G8 did not fail because of the current financial crisis. Even before the crisis, the G8 countries were not taking serious steps to meet their pledges to Africa.’ Giving praise where praise is due, Sachs points out that this year, despite a ‘massive budget crisis, the UK government has heroically honoured its aid commitments, showing that other countries could have done so if they had tried.’

What this situations tells every government in Africa is that they must understand, even more clearly than before, that we in Africa are our own saviours and that we should stop spending money on stupid things, such as purchasing luxury aircraft for presidential flights, while our children are dying from curable diseases, or from sheer malnutrition. I noticed that recently precious money was expended in Ghana to hold a conference to‘brand Ghana’. Even as the conference was taking place, a correspondent who visited Ghana five years ago went back to see the progress that had been made since his last visit. He chose to visit a little girl who wasborn exactly five years ago. He met the girl, Hannah Klutsey, running from her family's single-room house with tears in her eyes. A mouthful of bread had lodged in her throat and her eyes were bloodshot and bulging.

Her mother, Mary, dropped the bundle of firewood she had carried into the dusty compound and rushed to the huge plastic water pot in front of their ramshackle kitchen. She came back with a plastic cup of water, which Hannah gulped down. Only later, when the youngster was recovering on her mother's knee, did they notice the mosquito larvae at the bottom of the cup, ‘half a dozen worm like creatures writhing in the water’. 'The pot must have been left open for mosquitoes to lay eggs in the water,’ said the mother, whose immediate concern was that her only daughter, who had recently recovered from severe skin rashes, could fall ill again. ‘She survived her recent sickness by miracle: another illness could kill her,’ said the girl's father. There is no running water in Kpobiman, the poverty-stricken community outside Accra in which the family live. Like most of their neighbours, the household use water from a shallow borehole. ‘Othersa re forced to draw water from stagnant pools, where germs and parasites are abundant.’ Added the correspondent: ‘The water is so bad you can't imagine this community is just a stone's throw from the capital city of Ghana, Accra.’

Need I say that if the money used yearly to send delegations to listen to sweet words at the UN (sleep through them would be a more accurate description of what happens) had been used to improve life in the village visited by the correspondent, he would have contributed to ‘branding’ Ghana as a country in which progress is being made, not as one where life is getting worse for some people. Oh, and by the way, that type of ‘branding’ would not have cost the Ghanaian taxpayer a single penny.

{Cameron Duodu is a journalist, writer and commentator}

Assembly calls for change in employment rules for asylum seekers

Fri, 22 Oct 2010 11:58:00 +0000

The London Assembly today expressed its support for the ‘Still Human Still Here’ campaign which calls for a change in the rules governingthe right of asylum seekers to seek work.

In a motion agreed today, the Assembly said a change in policy would help many asylum seekers living in London out of poverty and would reduce the burden on the taxpayer and charities.

The campaign calls for asylum seekers whose cases are taking longer than six months or who have been refused asylum, but temporarily cannot return home through no fault of their own, to be given permission to work until their cases are finally resolved.

The Assembly called on the Mayor to join it in making representations to the Government in support of the campaign.

Darren Johnson AM, who proposed today’s motion, said:

“The majority of asylum seekers survive on just £5 a day. If asylum seekers were allowed to earn a living and pay their own way, it would improve their self-esteem and self-reliance. It would also reduce some of the hostility they face and the burden on the taxpayer.”

Jennette Arnold AM, who seconded the motion, said:

“This would provide a route out of poverty for asylum seekers affected, the majority of whom live in London. Something needs to be done to help those who have been waiting for more than six months to have their application dealt with. What we are arguing for is a workable and fair way to deal with those seeking shelter in this country.”

The full text of the motion reads as follows:

“This Assembly supports the Still Human Still Here campaign calling for asylum seekers who have been waiting for more than six months for their cases to be concluded, or who have beenrefused asylum but temporarily cannot be returned home through no faul tof their own, to be given permission to work until their cases are finally resolved. This policy would provide a route out of poverty for those affected, the majority of whom live in London, and reduce the burden on the taxpayer and the charitable sector.

“This Assembly resolves to make representations to the UK Government in support of this campaign, and calls on the Mayor to join it in making these representations, including by commissioning supporting evidence regarding the impact on London from GLA Economics.”

Extreme Poverty Among People With HIV In The UK Increasing

Thu, 21 Oct 2010 17:17:00 +0000

A new report on Poverty and HIV by NAT (National AIDS Trust) and Terrence Higgins Trust (THT) reveals at least one in six people diagnosed with HIV in the UK experienced severe poverty between2006 and 2009. Furthermore, the level of poverty experienced by people living with HIV has dramatically increased over recent years. In the current climate - and without determined Government action - the poverty crisis for people living with HIV is set to get worse.

New figures reveal recipients of grants from the Crusaid Hardship Fund, now run by THT, had an average weekly income of just £42 per week - less than half of the income they had 10 years ago (£93). In addition, many have no income at all. Most applicants are now living in extreme poverty with income at only 20 per cent of the average income for a single person1.

Nick Partridge, Chief Executive of THT comments: "The level of poverty people with HIV are experiencing across the UK has dramatically increased over recent years. Where the Hardship Fund used to buy people a fridge or pay for respite care, now it mainly goes on basic survival- food, clothes, a bed."

The report analyses the underlying reasons why people with HIV face poverty. Over a quarter (29 per cent) of applications to the Hardship Fund cited the immigration system as the primary reason for poverty. In October 2009, the Government support for single asylumseekers was reduced from £64.30 to £35.13 a week - just £5 a day. A further 17 per cent of applications said that problems relating to the benefits system were their main cause of hardship. Problems included awaiting a benefit decision, changes to the benefit system or delays in receiving benefits they were entitled to.

Deborah Jack, Chief Executive of NAT comments: "Charities are picking up the pieces of a poverty crisis in the UK, but there is only so much the sector's limited funds can do. The Government needs to address the underlying causes of this hardship, some of which it has been responsible for creating. Granting asylum seekers the right to work after six months and ensuring people are not left in poverty while waiting for their benefits to be processed are two crucial steps that would release many people with HIV out of the poverty trap.

The report identifies twenty recommendations that would address the root causes of poverty amongst people living with HIV.

Case Study

James, 35 years old and HIV positive, is currently living between friend's houses sleeping on their floors and occasionally in shop door ways. He came to the UK as an asylum seeker and has been granted leave to remain here. No longer eligible for housing under asylum support, he applied for benefits but has not received any payments. An investigation revealed that due to backlogs in the system, by the time James' claim was processed he was homeless and therefore did not qualify for the benefit. James is one of 7,900 people with HIV in the UK who have relied on a grant from the Crusaid Hardship Fund in the last three years, to pay for basic needs.

Notes

- A common measure of low income in the UK is 60% of the median weekly income of the general population. At present, the low income threshold is £115 a week for a single person without dependents after housing costs.

- Approximately 90,000 people are living with HIV in the UK.The relationship between poverty and HIV is cyclical. People in poverty are more likely to become infected, and poor health as a result of HIV can create poverty. Social impacts of the virus can also impact on poverty, and there is still significant stigma attached to the virus.

Source:

Terrence Higgins Trust